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CIVIL PROCEDURE: A REVIEW OF THE PUBLISHED
OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
FOR THE 1981-82 TERM
EDWARD B. ARNOLDS* AND ALLEN R. KAMP**
INTRODUCTION
During its 1981-82 term, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit decided a number of cases dealing with issues of
federal civil procedure. This article reviews most of those cases. The
cases have been classified, sometimes somewhat arbitrarily, under the
headings Federal Jurisdiction, Erie, Relation Back of Amendments,
Suits Against Officials in Their Official Capacity, Intervention, Class
Actions, Preliminary Injunctions, Sanctions, Civil Contempt, Directed
Verdicts, Entry of Judgments, Post-Trial Motions, Appellate Review of
Factual Determinations, and Collateral Estoppel, Res Judicata and
Law of the Case.***
I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. Diversity Cases
In Hamilton v. Nielsen,' a case which is interesting from an Erie2
standpoint as well as from a jurisdictional one, the court upheld federal
jurisdiction in a diversity action where the plaintiff beneficiary of a de-
cedent's trust brought suit against the executors of the decedent's will
alleging negligence in investment decisions on the part of the defend-
ants. The court of appeals noted that federal courts do not have the
power in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction to probate wills, 3 but held
that principle not to apply in this case where all that was being sought
* Edward B. Arnolds, Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; J.D.,
1973, The Northwestern University School of Law.
** Allen R. Kamp, Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; J.D., 1969;
The University of Chicago Law School.
*** Professor Arnolds reviewed the cases dealing with questions of federal jurisdiction; Pro-
fessor Kamp reviewed the remainder of the cases. The authors wish to thank Helen Scheller for
her research assistance on this article.
1. 678 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1982).
2. In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court held that the federal
courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases.
3. See Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1979).
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was an award of money damages against the executors personally for
their alleged negligence.
In the course of its opinion, however, the court indicated that the
result might have been different if the state had vested exclusive juris-
diction of such actions in probate courts. But since Illinois had vested
the probate jurisdiction in its courts of general jurisdiction, the circuit
courts4-the probate division and the law division of the Circuit Court
of Cook County are simply subdivisions of the same court of general
jurisdiction 5-the court said that retention of federal diversity j urisdic-
tion would "not interfere with a state policy of channeling all probate-
related matters to specialized courts."' 6 The implication that the federal
courts might not exercise diversity jurisdiction over matters which the
state has channeled to specialized courts is interesting from an Erie per-
spective because it expresses a willingness to defer to state procedural
interests in such cases.7
Another case involving diversity jurisdiction, American Motorists
Insurance Company v. The Trane Co. ,8 presented the issue of whether a
finding that one of the defendant insurers shared an interest with the
plaintiff insurance company in avoiding liability to the defendant in-
sured required realignment of the parties and therefore dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it
did because their interests in the litigation were the same since both
insurers shared an interest in escaping liability. The court of appeals
reversed stating that the question of realignment in such cases must
turn not on whether there are points of substantial agreement between
the parties but on whether there are points of substantial antagonism.
Realignment was improper because substantial conflict existed between
the insurers: a finding that one had no duty to defend, the court said,
could put the burden on defending squarely on the other; in addition, a
finding that one was liable would reduce or eliminate the liability of
the other. These conflicts justified their being on opposite sides of the
lawsuit. Thus diversity jurisdiction was sustained.
How to determine the amount in controversy in a diversity case
where the relief sought is a declaratory judgment was the issue in Jadair
4. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9; Alfaro v. Meagher, 27 IU. App. 3d 292, 326 N.E.2d 545 (lst
Dist. 1975).
5. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 7(c); Alfaro v. Meagher, 27 I11. App. 3d 292, 326 N.E.2d 545
(1st Dist. 1975).
6. 678 F.2d at 710.
7. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (federal bias for trial by jury out-
weighs, in diversity case, state practice of having judge decide particular issue).
8. 657 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1981).
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Inc. v. Walt Keeler Co.9 The court said it was proper in such cases to
consider the amount the plaintiff could possibly recover, including out-
of-pocket expenses and consequential damages.
B. Pendent Jurisdiction Cases
The court considered questions of pendent jurisdiction in several
cases. By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co.' 0 involved counterclaims in
an antitrust suit in which the defendant-counterplaintiff alleged that an
officer of the plaintiff-counterdefendant had tape recorded a telephone
conversation in violation of Title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968"1 and Article 14 of the Illinois
Criminal Code.' 2 The district court dismissed the Title III claim on a
motion for summary judgment and held: that the Article 14 count was
a permissive counterclaim which required an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction; that the independent basis did not exist because it
was a legal certainty that the requisite $10,000 amount in controversy
could not be proved; and that pendent jurisdiction should not be
exercised.
The court of appeals affirmed. As to the state law claim, the court
had to decide whether it was compulsory or permissive because com-
pulsory counterclaims come within the ancillary jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts and require no independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
According to Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [FRCP],
whether a counterclaim is compulsory depends on whether it arises out
of the same "transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter" of the
main suit. But this formula, the court said, is a conclusion rather than
a test and so requires looking at the purpose of the rule.
The principal purpose of making certain counterclaims compul-
sory, in the court's opinion, was judicial economy and the avoidance of
multiple trials. Here, however, the district court had said it would have
ordered a separate trial on the counterclaim anyway. Applying its pur-
pose-of-the-rule test, the court of appeals concluded, "in the language
of Rule 13(a), that the state-law count in Armen-Berry's counterclaim
arose not out of the antitrust conspiracy, that is the subject matter of
the main suit, but out of a telephone conversation that was a different
transaction and occurrence from the conspiracy."' 13
9. 679 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1982).
10. 668 F.2d 956 (7th Cir. 1982).
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 14-1 to 14-9 (1981).
13. 668 F.2d at 961. The district court would have ordered a separate trial because it be-
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The counterclaim was therefore permissive, but it would still with-
stand dismissal if there were an independent basis for jurisdiction.
Since diversity existed between the parties, the question was amount in
controversy, which turned on whether Armen-Berry could possibly ob-
tain at least $10,000 in punitive damages. Interpreting Illinois law to
be that no punitive damages may be awarded absent actual damages,
the court found that there could be no independent basis for federal
jurisdiction.
Finally, the court held for two reasons that the district court had
not abused its discretion in refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction
over the state count in the counterclaim. First, because the federal
claim had been dismissed before trial;' 4 and, second, because the same
considerations-of judicial economy and federalism-underlie both
the compulsory-counterclaim rule and the pendent-jurisdiction doc-
trine. Said the court:
[I]n a case where considerations of judicial economy do not support
federal retention of a counterclaim, as is implied by a conclusion that
the counterclaim is not compulsory, a federal court should not as-
sume jurisdiction of the counterclaim in the name of pendent juris-
diction. The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction should not be used to
make end runs around the limitations in Rule 13(a).' 5
Although the case involved homely facts, Hixon v. Sherwin- Wil-
liams Co. 16 also involved an interesting question of pendent jurisdic-
tion. After an Indiana couple sustained water damage to their kitchen
floor, their insurance company, a non-resident corporation, hired
Hixon, an Indiana resident, to install a new linoleum floor. Hixon sub-
contracted the job to Sherwin-Williams, also a non-resident corpora-
tion. Sherwin-Williams, in turn, hired Louis Benkovich to do the
linoleum installation. Benkovich used an extremely flammable glue,
which exploded, and the insurance company had to indemnify the
homeowners for an additional $27,000 for damages to their house.
The insurance company and Hixon brought suit against Sherwin-
Williams in a federal district court in Indiana. Since the insurance
company and Sherwin-Williams were corporate citizens of different
states, and since there was more than $10,000 in controversy, federal
lieved that the real reason for bringing the counterclaim was to insinuate a "Watergate-type" aura
about the trial and the court of appeals seemed to agree with the district court's comment. It may
be that this case is best understood by recognizing that the courts regarded the counterclaim pri-
marily as a trial tactic.
14. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
15. 668 F.2d at 962.
16. 671 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1982).
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diversity jurisdiction existed between them.' 7 Hixon, however, al-
though he was of diverse citizenship from Sherwin-Williams, had a
claim for less than $10,000. The question was whether the doctrine of
pendent party jurisdiction allowed the district court to adjudicate
Hixon's claim because it was joined with the insurance company's,
even though it would not have been within federal jurisdiction if sued
on alone.
The court noted that in pendent party cases, unlike pendent claim
cases, "there is no federal-question claimant; there is only a diversity
claimant, who may not even be a member of a class intended to be
protected by the diversity jurisdiction."18 The court interpreted Zahn v.
International Paper Co. 19 as a rejection of pendent party jurisdiction
and ruled that "a pendent party must meet the amount in controversy
requirement of the diversity jurisdiction. '20
In yet another pendent jurisdiction case, United States ex rel. Hoo-
ver v. Franzen,21 the court held that a state constitutional claim cannot
be raised as a pendent claim in a habeas corpus action brought in fed-
eral court under the habeas grant of jurisdiction.22 Hoover and nine
other inmates of an Illinois prison brought suit in federal district court
challenging their transfers from state custody to federal custody. They
alleged that the transfers violated their rights under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, certain federal statutes, 23 and Article I, section 11
of the Illinois Constitution, which provides, "No person shall be trans-
ported out of state for an offense committed within the state."
The district court granted relief for eight of the petitioners, who
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (c) (1976).
18. 671 F.2d at 1008.
19. 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (holding that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not
justify an exception in class-action cases to the usual rule that a federal district court can assume
jurisdiction only over those plaintiffs whose claims are in excess of $10,000).
20. 671 F.2d at 1009. The court premised its jurisdictional holding on the alternative ground
that a sound exercise of discretion would have required the district court to dismiss Hixon's claim
since that claim was "too tiny to warrant a federal district court's taking upon itself the decision of
a possibly difficult issue of Indiana law" which was not otherwise presented in the case, and be-
cause, since Hixon was a resident of Indiana, the policy underlying diversity jurisdiction was
inapplicable to him. But Hixon must now go to state court for relief and file another lawsuit, thus
creating additional burdens and causing additional expense of time and money for all parties
involved, including the state court system. One cannot help but wonder if Indiana might not
actually prefer to have the federal court decide Hixon's claim.
21. 669 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1982).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) and § 2241(c)(3) (1976). The court was careful to limit its holding to
cases brought under the habeas statute and indicated that different considerations would be in-
volved if the case had been brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980); however, the court did not decide whether an action challenging transfer could be
brought under section 1983 or if habeas corpus is the exclusive procedure.
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4001(a), 5003 (1976).
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were to be transferred to federal prison outside of Illinois, on the basis
of the Illinois Constitution.24 The district court reasoned that under
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs25 it could take pendent jurisdiction of
the state constitutional claims, and could decide those before deciding
the federal constitutional claims.
After first holding that a pendent state law claim is governed in all
respects by state law, making the federal remedy of habeas corpus un-
available, the court of appeals, recognizing that on remand the district
court would simply impose whatever state remedy might exist, reached
the pendent jurisdiction issue. The lower court erred, the higher court
said, by applying only the two-pronged test of Gibbs-whether the fed-
eral claim is of sufficient substance to confer federal jurisdiction and
whether the federal claim and the state claim arise out of a "common
nucleus of operative fact."
This analysis, the court said, reached only the constitutional ques-
tion of whether the exercise of pendent jurisdiction was consistent with
the limitations of Article III. But even if it has the power to entertain
pendent jurisdiction, the district court, under Gibbs, must still exercise
discretion, which requires "a balancing of factors such as comity, fair-
ness to the litigants, judicial economy, and the state's interest in ad-
ministering its affairs."'26 Moreover, Gibbs does not end the inquiry. In
Aldinger v. Howard,27 the United States Supreme Court held that pen-
dent jurisdiction did not exist over a state law claim against a county
which was pended to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought against
a county official at a time when counties were deemed excluded from
coverage in § 1983.28 The Court inferred that since counties had been
excluded from § 1983 they also had been excluded from the jurisdic-
tional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Pendent jurisdiction could not be
exercised because the intent of Congress was not to extend federal ju-
risdiction over counties in such cases.
In Aldinger, the court of appeals noted, a new party (the county)
was brought before the court, which distinguished it from the instant
case. However, in Owen Equoment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,29 the
24. The district court also granted habeas relief to the two prisoners who were to be trans-
ferred to federal prisons in Illinois, on the basis of § 5003(a). The court of appeals reversed as to
these prisoners also.
25. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
26. 669 F.2d at 438.
27. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
28. This interpretation of § 1983 was overruled in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social
Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
29. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
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Supreme Court extended its reasoning in Aldinger to exclude the exer-
cise of ancillary jurisdiction over a claim brought under FRCP 14 by a
plaintiff directly against a third-party defendant who had been im-
pleaded by the original defendant where no diversity existed between
the plaintiff and the third-party defendant. Examining the underlying
statutory grant of jurisdiction--diversity in Owen-the Court found
that Congress had by implication negated the exercise of diversity j uris-
diction over the FRCP 14 claim, even though, unlike Aldinger, the
third-party defendant in Owen was already properly in federal court.
Although Owen can easily be distinguished from Hoover,30 the
court of appeals went on to examine whether Congress had "spoken to
the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over state law claims in the matter
of habeas corpus."' 31 After a fairly exhaustive historical inquiry, the
court concluded that the peculiar structure of the habeas corpus stat-
utes indicates a congressional intent to exclude state claims from fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction. The Hoover court stressed the
narrowness of the issue, the uniqueness of the federal statutory scheme,
and the "incomparably unique" problems of federalism involved, and
it "expressly eschew[ed] any broad principles capable of adoption for
general application to questions of pendent jurisdiction. ' 32 Neverthe-
less, the court's reasoning is instructive:
Our analysis turns on whether it can be demonstrated that Congress
has intended that the particular pendent claim not be brought in fed-
eral court .... [Sluch congressional intent may not be demon-
strated merely by negative implication from Congress' creation ofjurisdiction over a certain class of claims. 33
C Removal Cases
The court decided several cases in which removal jurisdiction 34
was a principal issue. In Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Airco Industrial
Gases,35 the issues were whether a removal petition was defective for
failing to allege, as is required by case law, the nominal party status of
30. In the Owen situation a plaintiff who knew that one defendant would implead another
could avoid the requirement of complete diversity simply by waiting until the original defendant
impleaded the other defendant and then bringing a claim under Rule 14, thus accomplishing
indirectly what it could not accomplish directly. Although this tactic was not present in Owen, the
Court seemed particularly concerned about the possibility. 437 U.S. at 374-75. In Hoover, the
plaintiffs were not using pendent jurisdiction to get into court indirectly defendants they could not
otherwise sue there.
31. 669 F.2d at 441.
32. Id.
33. 669 F.2d at 441 n.15.
34. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-48 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
35. 676 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1982).
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a defendant who did not join in the petition; and whether an amended
removal petition filed 30 days after service of the state court complaint
on defendant's counsel was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 36 The
court held the amendment was effective to correct a technically defec-
tive initial petition because part of the state court record, attached to
the removal petition as an exhibit, contained the necessary information
regarding the nominal party status.
A second case involving § 1446(b), Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big
Ten) Conference Athletic Association,37 presented the question:
[I]f a case initially filed in state court is removable to federal court
but the defendant waives his right to remove, under what circum-
stances will that right revive if the plaintiff subsequently amends his
complaint to add new federal claims. 38
Plaintiff had brought suit in Illinois state court alleging that the defend-
ant athletic association's rules denied him equal protection and due
process in violation of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Al-
though the case was removable to federal court, the defendants did not
attempt to remove it, and the thirty-day limitation of § 1446(b) ran.
The litigation was proceeding well for the plaintiff in state court-he
had obtained a preliminary injunction which allowed him to play foot-
ball in spite of the Big Ten rules-when he amended his complaint to
include a "scattershot" of new "makeweight" federal claims which
were "insubstantial. ' 39 The defendant, gleefully the court suggests, re-
moved the case to the federal district court, which refused to remand it
to state court and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all
counts.
A judicially-created exception to the thirty-day limitation on re-
moval of § 1446(b) exists where the plaintiff amends his complaint to
the extent that the nature of his action has been changed to constitute a
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1976) provides:
(b) The petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within
thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of
the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceed-
ing is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if
such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the
defendant, whichever period is shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a petition for removal may
be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of
a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.
After 30 days, amendments to correct "defective allegations of jurisdiction" are permitted under
28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1976).
37. 668 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1982).
38. Id at 964.
39. Id. at 965.
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"substantially new suit." The term substantially new suit is, said the
court of appeals, not self defining; rather, one must look to the purpose
of the thirty-day limitation, which is twofold:
to deprive the defendant of the undeserved tactical advantage that he
would have if he could wait and see how he was faring in state court
before deciding whether to remove the case to another court system;
and to prevent the delay and waste of resources involved in starting a
case over in a second court after significant proceedings, extending
over months or even years, may have taken place in the first court.
The proper allocation of decision making between state and federal
courts must also be considered.
Exceptions to the thirty-day limitation rule, according to the court,
would include: where a plaintiff deliberately holds back on a strong
federal claim in his original complaint, while including an insubstantial
one, and then, having induced the defendant to waive his right to re-
move, amends the complaint to add his strong federal grounds; or
where newly discovered facts cause the plaintiff to amend his complaint
in a way that fundamentally alters it. In these cases the purposes of the
limitation would not be violated by permitting removal. But in Wilson
there was no deliberate misleading and the amendments did not drasti-
cally change the basic legal theory. Indeed, removal would have re-
duced judicial economy by interrupting active litigation and would
have given the defendants an unearned tactical advantage by allowing
them to get away from what had proven to be an unfavorable forum.
Moreover, the removal here was an example of the danger of undue
encroachment by the federal courts on the authority of the state court
since the claimant, who was winning in state court, ended up losing in
federal court on a state constitutional issue. The case was, therefore,
remanded to state court.
Two removal cases decided by the court involved actions brought
by the State of Illinois in state court to enforce the Illinois Environmen-
tal Protection Act.4 ' In Nuclear Engineering Co. v. Scott, 42 then Attor-
ney General William Scott sued Nuclear Engineering Company [NEC]
in the Illinois Circuit Court. NEC removed the case to federal district
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 alleging both federal question and
diversity jurisdiction. The claim of federal question jurisdiction was
based on the theory that questions of federal law were inextricably
bound up with Illinois' claims even though the state had artfully
40. Id.
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, 1001-51 (1981).
42. 660 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1622 (1982).
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pleaded the claim to avoid any reference to federal law. The court of
appeals held that state law incorporation of federal law did not permit
the claim to be construed as essentially federal in character.43
The allegation of diversity jurisdiction in Nuclear Engineering was
based on the theory that, although states are not considered "citizens"
for diversity purposes, Scott in his individual capacity was the real
party plaintiff. This theory had its origins in two cases. In Ex Parte
Young," the Supreme Court ruled that the eleventh amendment was
not a bar to a suit seeking prospective relief from a state official where
the official had exercised his authority unconstitutionally. In Ohio ex
rel. Seney v. Swift Co. ,45 the Sixth Circuit held that an action brought
by a state official to enforce a statute alleged to be unconstitutional
could only be deemed to be brought by an official in his individual
capacity, so the rule of law that states are not citizens for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 1332 did not preclude assertion of diversity jurisdiction over
that action. Conceding that to do so "produces the anomalous result
that a state official alleged to have acted in an unconstitutional fashion
may be considered a 'state actor' for some purposes and not for others,"
the Seventh Circuit declined to follow Seney on the grounds that none
of the purposes underlying diversity jurisdiction compelled employing
the fiction of Ex Parte Young in this case. Therefore the district court
was ordered to remand the case to the state court.
Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.4 was the other case involv-
ing the Illinois Environmental Protection Act. There, as in Nuclear En-
gineering, the state sued in a state court alleging only claims grounded
on state law, and the defendant removed pursuant to § 1441. Kerr-
McGee argued federal question jurisdiction on the theory that the
Atomic Energy Act 47 preempted state regulation of radioactive waste,
the subject matter of the suit. The Seventh Circuit, siding with the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits,4 8 and against the Second Circuit,49 held that
the issue of federal preemption is merely a defense to state law claims
and therefore cannot be a ground for removal.
In the final removal case, Otto v. State Board of Elections, ° the
43. Id. at 249.
44. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
45. 270 F. 141 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 633 (1921).
46. 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
48. First Nat'l Bank v. Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 853 (8th Cir. 1980); Washington
v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 1972).
49. Beech-Nut, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 480 F.2d 801, 803 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. 661 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1981).
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court held that abstention was not a basis for remand under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) 51 stating: "Abstention is a judicially-created doctrine; its ap-
plication is discretionary. Under Thermtron [Products, Inc. v. Herman,
423 U.S. 336 (1976)] a federal court with jurisdiction over a removed
case may not remand it on discretionary grounds. 52
D. Appellate Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the court of appeals was at issue in a number of
cases. Over a strong dissent by Judge Swygert, the court decided in
Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co. 5 3 that an order refusing to appoint
counsel for an indigent civil plaintiff did not come within the narrow
collateral order exception to the final order rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.54
The collateral order doctrine was first enunciated in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.55 and was most recently addressed by the
Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,56 where the
Court held that the denial of a motion for disqualification of an attor-
ney did not come within the exceptions. The key issue in that case,
according to the Court, was whether the order was "effectively unre-
viewable" after a final judgment. In deciding that an order denying a
motion for appointment of counsel is unappealable, the Seventh Cir-
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1976) provides:
(c) If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed im-
providently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case, and may
order the payment of just costs. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed
by its clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with
such case.
52. 661 F.2d at 1134. This holding seems somewhat questionable. Thermtron held only that
"an otherwise properly removed action may no more be remanded because the district court con-
siders itself too busy to try it than an action properly filed in the federal court in the first instance
may be dismissed or referred to state courts for such reason." 423 U.S. at 344. Moreover, al-
though abstention, under Otto, is not a basis for remand, the district court apparently may abstain
from hearing a removed case. While the court of appeals strongly suggests that abstention would
not be appropriate in Otto, there will undoubtedly be removal cases where the abstention doctrine
applies. One wonders where such cases will be heard. On the other hand, if abstention were
inapplicable to removal cases defendants could easily circumvent the doctrine of abstention by
removal. Although some would argue that any limitation on the judicially created doctrine of
abstention is good, Otto raises some theoretical problems, at least in those abstention cases where
the district court does not retain jurisdiction of the federal questions.
53. 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
54. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides:
The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the
Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands,
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.
55. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
56. 449 U.S. 368 (1981). See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Car-
son v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981).
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cuit overruled a previous case5 7 and adopted the minority position.58
In another collateral order case, Freeman v. Kohl & Vick Machine
Works, Inc. ,59 the court held that doctrine did not apply to an order
denying summary judgment, even though the denial contained a con-
flict of law ruling which served to deny appellant's alleged immunity
from suit.
Whyte v. THinc Consulting Group International60 dealt with an ap-
peal from an order staying judicial proceedings and compelling arbitra-
tion. The court held, first, that the order was not final within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.61 Plaintiff argued, nevertheless, that the
court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because the order
was, in effect, an order "granting or refusing. . . an injunction." This
issue was decided against the plaintiff under the so-called "Enelow-
Ettleson" rule, which "turns on whether the underlying cause of action
is one which before the merger of law and equity was by its nature at
law or in equity. ' 62 The stay is appealable only if the underlying ac-
tion is legal, on the theory that the stay in such cases is analogous to an
equitable restraint of legal proceedings. Whyte's complaint was for a
declaratory judgment and an injunction against arbitration. These be-
ing equitable remedies, the order was not appealable because, under
the theory, it was merely an order of a court of equity concerning its
own proceedings. Regardless, Whyte argued, the order ought to be ap-
pealable under § 1291(a)(1) because it had the effect of refusing his re-
quest to enjoin the arbitration proceeding. Noting a conflict among the
circuits, 63 the court held that even in such cases the Enelow-Ettleson
rule applies and that the order was not appealable since the underlying
action was equitable.
The issue of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
arose again in Miller v. Bell,64 a Freedom of Information Act 65 [FOIA]
suit. The district court ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
turn over certain material excised from documents released to the
57. Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO General, 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980), overruled, 664 F.2d
1064 (1981).
58. 664 F.2d at 1068 n.3 (Swygert, S.C.J., dissenting).
59. 673 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1982).
60. 659 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1981).
61. But see City of Naples v. The Prepakt Concrete Co., 494 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 843 (1974).
62. 659 F.2d at 819.
63. Id. at n.6. Especially given the difficulties in deciding what is legal and what is equitable,
see, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), it would seem appropriate for the
Supreme Court to decide the issue.
64. 661 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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plaintiff. The agency appealed. Other issues still remained before the
district court. Plaintiff argued that the order was therefore not final
and not appealable. The court of appeals held that a disclosure order
in an FOIA suit is injunctive in nature and therefore appealable under
§ 1291(a)(1).
In Nuclear Engineering Co. v. Scott,66 also discussed above, an in-
terlocutory appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 67 A ju-
risdictional prerequisite for appeals brought under that section is that
they be filed within 10 days of the entry of the certification order. In
Nuclear Engineering the district court entered its certification on June
25. On July 1, defendant moved to amend the order to certify an addi-
tional question. On July 3, the district court granted the motion. On
July 11, within 10 days of the entry of the amended certification order
but not of the original one, the plaintiff filed its request for interlocu-
tory appeal.
The issue was whether the 10-day period should be computed
from June 25 or from July 3. Finding no clear answer to that question,
the court looked to the purpose behind § 1292(b)-to foster greater ju-
dicial efficiency. Weighing the delay against the benefits of materially
advancing the litigation and avoiding unnecessary expense that would
be gained by deciding the disputed jurisdictional question before it,
and considering that no party was prejudiced by the delay, and that the
district court had reentered the certification order in amended form, the
court of appeals found it had jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
The court pointed out, though, the more prudent path is to file an
appeal within 10 days of the certification of any order under § 1292(b),
rather than seeking an amended order if the district court's framing of
the question is not to one's liking, because appeals are from orders, not
questions of law, and if the order is properly before the court of appeals
all relevant questions can be considered. Thus, in Nuclear Engineering,
certifying the order finding that diversity jurisdiction existed would
66. 660 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1622 (1982).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) provides:
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise ap-
pealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application
is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That appli-
cation for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
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have been sufficient, without amendment, to bring the issue of federal
question jurisdiction before the court of appeals.
In Central Soya Co. v. Voktas, 68 the court held that a United States
Magistrate is authorized, in certain circumstances, to certify an order
for interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b).
E Special Jurisdiction Cases
In a number of cases the court considered questions of the jurisdic-
tion of the district courts arising under special jurisdiction statutes.
Overnite Transportation Co. v. Chicago Industrial Tire Co.69 involved
an interstate shipment of goods where the defendant had allegedly paid
the freight charges but not the contract price ($2,210) of a C.O.D. ship-
ment and the carrier had mistakenly released the goods. The district
court dismissed holding that the Interstate Commerce Act 70 [ICA] did
not regulate the contract price of goods so there was no subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a). 71 The court of appeals af-
firmed, and also said that the $10,000 amount in controversy require-
ment of the ICA applied also to all remedies inferable from the ICA, so
the requisite amount in controversy was also lacking.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Regional Transportation Author-
ity, 72 individual plaintiffs and certain municipalities challenged, on
fourteenth amendment grounds, the constitutionality of the Illinois Re-
tailers' Occupation Tax.7 3 The court held that 28 U.S.C. § 134174 de-
prived the district court of jurisdiction because the individual plaintiff
had state court remedies, and the plaintiff municipalities, although they
had no state court remedy, could not challenge the validity of a state
statute under the fourteenth amendment because they were "creatures
and instrumentalities of the state" in spite of the home-rule provision
68. 661 F.2d 78 (7th Cir. 1981).
69. 668 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1981).
70. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding aris-
ing under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce
against restraints and monopolies: Provided, however, That the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of an action brought under section 20(11) of part I of the Interstate
Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. 20( 11)) or section 219 of part II of such Act (49 U.S.C. 319),
only if the matter in controversy for each receipt or bill of lading exceeds $10,000, exclu-
sive of interest and costs.
72. 653 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1981).
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, 11704.03 (1981).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) provides:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or col-
lection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State.
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of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. 71 In another § 1341 case, Schneider
Transport, Inc. v. Cattanach,76 the court held that § 1341 barred a suit
seeking to enjoin a Wisconsin law imposing vehicle registration fees
where there was a plain, speedy and efficient remedy in the state courts.
In three cases, the court entertained appeals from district court dis-
missals of suits where their jurisdiction was premised on Section 405(g)
of the Social Security Act, 7 7 which provides that "Any individual, after
any final decision of the Secretary [of Health, Education and Welfare]
made after a hearing to which he was a party, . . . may obtain a re-
view . . . in [a] district court of the United States. . . ." In Watters v.
Harris,78 the court held that § 4 05(g) did not authorize judicial review
of the refusal by the Secretary to extend the time period for a hearing
on benefits and that plaintiffs allegation of "good cause" for the re-
quested extension did not present a "colorable constitutional claim."
The Supreme Court, in Weinberger v. Sa/0 7 9 and Mathews v. El-
dridge,8 0 had recognized such a claim as an exception to § 405(g)'s re-
quirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In Giacone v.
Schweiker,8 on the other hand, where the plaintiff alleged "that he was
seriously and substantially misled by the fabian tactics of the Rockford
Social Security office," 8 2 which never informed him of the availability
of "good cause" extensions, the court of appeals held the Eldridge ex-
ception applicable and directed the district court to remand the case to
the agency to determine the good cause issue. But in Northlake Com-
munity Hospital v. United States,8 3 the court, also applying an Eldridge
analysis, found that the claim of entitlement to a pre-termination hear-
ing in the termination of a Medicare provider agreement did not pres-
ent a colorable constitutional claim, so § 405(g) did not confer subject
matter jurisdiction on the district court where there had not yet been a
hearing or final decision.
II. ERIE
In two cases decided last term, the court dealt with problems
raised by the application of state law in federal cases. In the first, Me-
75. 653 F.2d at 1151.
76. 657 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1257 (1982).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
78. 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1980).
79. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
80. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
81. 656 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1981).
82. Id. at 1244.
83. 654 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1981).
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morial Hospital for McHenry County v. Shadur ,84 the hospital sought
the issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition to compel the dis-
trict court to vacate a discovery order directing it to turn over certain
documents. The order was entered in a civil antitrust action brought
by a doctor charging the hospital and others with conspiracy in re-
straint of trade in that it had prevented the doctor from practicing on
the hospital staff. The doctor requested production of all documents
related to proceedings instituted by the hospital against the physicians
who had applied for or were granted admission to its medical staff.
Proceedings of this kind are privileged under the Illinois Medical Stud-
ies Act.85 Section 5 of the Act makes the unauthorized disclosure of the
information obtained in the course of such proceedings a Class A mis-
demeanor. The hospital argued that where the state has an important
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of certain information, con-
siderations of federalism and comity require federal judges sitting in
the state to give effect to the state's policy as embodied in its criminal
code.
The court of appeals held that discovery in civil actions brought in
the federal courts is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
rather than state law. Because the principal claim in the case arose
under the Sherman Act, state law did not apply as the rule of decision
as to that claim, and thus the district court was not required to apply
state law in determining whether the material sought by the doctor was
privileged. Rather, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 501,86 the
court had to determine the question according to the principles of com-
mon law. In doing so, federal courts should consider the law of the
state in which the case arose. Federal courts should recognize state
privileges where that can be accomplished at no substantial cost to fed-
eral substantive and procedural policy. Here the public interest in pri-
vate enforcement of the federal antitrust law was too strong to permit
the exclusion of the evidence. Thus the state interests here were out-
weighed by the federal interests in promoting discovery.
84. 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51 $ 101-05 (1981).
86. FED. R. EVID. 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However,
m civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State
law.
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In Sharp v. Egler,87 the court was also faced with a problem raised
by the Erie doctrine. 88 The district court there, under Erie, had to ap-
ply the law that would have been applied by the Indiana state court.
The question then became what law would Indiana courts apply in a
case where the driver had driven from Kentucky into Indiana and there
hit a tree. The court discusses the problem of deciding what conflicts of
law rules Indiana has adopted. A review of the applicable authorities
shows that the Indiana choice of law rule may be either the significant
contacts rule or lex loci delicti. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's analysis of the Indiana law. The case is an interesting example
of the problem of determining choice of law under Erie where the state
court has not given clear guidance on what its choice of law rule is.
III. RELATION BACK OF AMENDMENTS
In Stewart v. United States ,89 the court dealt with the relation back
of amendments pursuant to FRCP 15. Stewart had sued the Postal
Service and its truck driver on May 26, 1980. The government moved
to dismiss or for summary judgment on the ground that the United
States is the only proper defendant under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 90 The district court granted the motion to dismiss, noting that a
July 23 amendment of the complaint adding the United States as de-
fendant was not effective because of a six-month limitation period
which is jurisdictional in nature. The plaintiff on appeal argued that
her suit against the truck driver, an employee of the United States, was
in effect a suit against the United States. The court ruled that the plain-
tiff had no cause of action against an employee and that the amend-
ment could not relate back to March 26, 1980 under Rule 15(c). 91
87. 658 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1981).
88. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
89. 655 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1981).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) provides:
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or at-
tempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date
of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is
asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period pro-
vided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by an
amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be
prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known
that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have
been brought against him.
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or his designee, or
the Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer who would have been
a proper defendant is named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (I) and (2) hereof with
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Relation back under the rule requires that actual notice be received by
the government within the period provided by law for commencing the
action. No notice, formal or informal, occurred during the limitations
period. The court noted that plaintiffs remedy is a malpractice suit.
IV. SUITS AGAINST OFFICIALS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY
In Kincaid v. Rusk,92 a prisoner's lawsuit, the Seventh Circuit dealt
with the problem of substitution of officials sued in their official capac-
ity. The appellant Daryl Kincaid sought declaratory and compensa-
tory relief for damages suffered while he was a pre-trial detainee in the
custody of appellee, Sheriff John Rusk. Kincaid was confined in the
Tippecanoe County, Indiana jail while waiting trial on a murder
charge. He claimed that the sheriff had violated certain of his constitu-
tional rights. After the entry of judgment below but before argument
in the appellate court, defendant John Rusk died. On its motion, the
court ordered that Rusk's successor in office, Sheriff Harger, be added
as an additional defendant. The question was whether or not Rusk's
death had mooted the appeal. The court found that the damage action
was not moot. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(1) 93 pro-
vides that an action does not abate when a public official resigns or
otherwise ceases to hold office but that a successor is automatically sub-
stituted as a party.
The court noted that this rule contemplates the automatic substitu-
tion of successors to public officers sued in their official capacity. The
court stated that a demand for declaratory or injunctive relief imposes
a substantial burden on the plaintiff to show survival of the contro-
versy, the burden being on the complainant to establish the need for
such relief by demonstrating that the successor in office would continue
the policies of his predecessor. On the other hand, an official-capacity
suit that seeks compensatory damages survives because the suit is based
on alleged past misconduct. The court noted that such a suit involves
respect to the United States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action
as a defendant.
92. 670 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1982).
93. FED. R. App. P. 43(c)(1) provides:
(c) Public Officers; Death or Separation from Office.
(1) When a public officer is a party to an appeal or other proceeding in the court of
appeals in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases
to hold office, the action does not abate and his successor is automatically substituted as
a party. Proceedings following the substitution shall be in the name of the substituted
party, but any misnomer not affecting the substantial rights of the parties shall be disre-
garded. An order of substitution may be entered at any time, but the omission to enter
such an order shall not affect the substitution.
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the difficult question of personal as well as governmental liability. The
Seventh Circuit stated that the Supreme Court has apparently an-
swered this question in Monell v. Department of Social Services ,94
where the Court noted that official-capacity suits generally are only a
way of pleading an action against an entity of which the officer is an
agent. Thus the official-capacity suit directed at a named public officer
is not mooted when the named officer dies or is succeeded in office
because the purpose and effect of such a suit is to recover damages
from the public entity only. The government and not the public officer
is solely responsible for satisfying a judgment rendered against an of-
ficer sued in his official capacity. 95 Thus the court noted that the substi-
tution was permissible under Appellate Rule 43. Note that this
procedure continues the fiction of suing the public official when the real
target is the government entity.
V. INTERVENTION
In Wade v. Goldschmidt,96 AMPS, Inc. and others appealed a de-
nial of their motion to intervene in a dispute relating to the construc-
tion of the Central Illinois Expressway and a bridge to carry that
highway across the Illinois River. The plaintiffs in that case had filed
an amended complaint against the Department of Transportation of
the United States claiming that the routing of the Central Illinois Ex-
pressway violated the National Environmental Policy Act,9 7 the Fed-
eral Aid Highway Act, 98 and the Federal Department of
Transportation Act. 99 The district court granted a temporary re-
straining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from
awarding a contract for construction of the proposed bridge over the
Illinois River. The proposed intervenors included certain counties and
cities located in central Illinois and AMPS, a not-for-profit corporation
formed specifically to support construction of the proposed bridge and
expressway. The district court had denied intervention. The court of
appeals said the intervenor had met neither the requirements for inter-
vention of right nor permissive intervention pursuant to FRCP 24.100
Intervention as of right under FRCP 24(a)(2) requires a direct and sig-
nificant legally protectable interest in the property or transaction sub-
94. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
95. 670 F.2d at 742 n.7.
96. 673 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1982).
97. 42 U.S.C. §4331(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
98. 23 U.S.C. §§ 109, 138 (1976).
99. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
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ject to the action. In this case, the only issue was whether or not the
governmental bodies satisfied the federal statutory procedural require-
ments. Thus although the intervenors had an interest in the outcome of
the litigation, their interests did not relate to the property or transaction
which was the subject of the action, and therefore they failed to assert
an interest in the lawsuit sufficient to warrant intervention as of right.
Nor were the intervenors allowed permissive intervention under
FRCP 24(b)(2). The court emphasized that the issue to be decided by
the district court was whether or not the government defendants had
complied with certain federal laws, therefore the court below could not
consider the questions raised by applicants involving basic value judg-
ments as to the ultimate location of the proposed construction and the
priority of the various interests involved. Thus it cannot be said that
any of the intervenor's claims or defenses in the present action had a
question of law or fact in common so as to satisfy the requirement for
permissive intervention pursuant to FRCP 24(b)(2). The trial court did
not, therefore, abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for
permissive intervention. This non-permissive view towards interven-
tion contrasts with that of some circuits which would have allowed in-
tervention in such cases.' 0 ' The spirit of the holding here contradicts
the court's concern for those possibly affected by the judgment in the
class action suit, Simer v. Rios, 0 2 discussed below. That case held that
putative class members should be notified if a settlement affects their
interests-but here parties whose interests were affected were denied an
opportunity to intervene.
VI. CLASS ACTIONS
The Seventh Circuit decided three interesting class action cases.
In Simer v. Rios,'0 3 the court commented on many aspects of class ac-
tion procedure. Simer was initiated as a class action by eight individu-
als and the Gray Panthers of Chicago.' 0 4 They alleged several claims
against the Community Services Administration (CSA) for its adminis-
tration of a crisis intervention program which was designed to enable
low-income individuals and families to participate in energy conserva-
101. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
102. 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1773 (1982).
103. Id.
104. At the time the class action was filed, the class was described as "all low income persons
otherwise eligible for participation in the 1979 C.I.P. who were denied 1979 C.I.P. assistance by
the federal defendants or discouraged from applying for assistance because they were not delin-
quent in the payment of their fuel bills for 1979." Id. at 664.
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tion programs. The problem was that the regulations adopted by the
CSA conditioned the grant of assistance payments upon the production
of a utility shutoff notice for the non-payment of a utility bill. Plaintiffs
alleged that this regulation violated the Emergency Energy Conserva-
tion Services Program, which provided that "[e]ligibility for any of the
programs authorized under this section shall not be based solely on
delinquency in payment of fuel bills."' 10 5 When the district court indi-
cated that it would rule for the plaintiffs, counsel for CSA indicated
that settlement discussion might be appropriate. The settlement even-
tually agreed to by the parties provided for funding of programs seek-
ing long range solutions to the energy problems for the elderly. At no
time was the issue of class certification or notice to the putative 0 6 class
members discussed, nor was settlement conditioned upon class certifi-
cation or the putative class being bound by the judgment. Thus the
case was one that had been filed as a class action but had never been
certified pursuant to FRCP 23.' o7
After the settlement, problems arose. A Wall Street Journal arti-
cle, entitled "A Sweetheart of a Lawsuit," indicated that the settlement
was the result of collusion between the CSA and plaintiffs' counsel.
Certain senators, including Senator Paul Laxalt, became quite upset
with the ruling. (A copy of Senator Laxalt's letter to defendant Rios
was sent to the district court judge who had signed the settlement de-
cree.) Finally the district court issued an order on its own motion call-
ing for a status conference in the case. The court there vacated the
order approving the settlement, denied the motion for class certifica-
tion, and held the claims of the organizational plaintiffs non-justiciable.
The trial court concluded that since the eight individual plaintiffs had
received their relief and class action certification had been denied there
was no case or controversy before the court and dismissed the case with
prejudice.
First the court of appeals had to decide whether or not the district
court properly acted within the scope of FRCP 60(bl by vacating the
judgment approving the settlement decree. The court found that the
settlement had not been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud and
thus there were no grounds for vacating it pursuant to FRCP
60(b)(3).10 8 The settlement was wrong, however, because the judgment
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(5) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
106. "Putative" here means the members of the uncertified class.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
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was entered in violation of due process. The settlement's entry without
notice to the putative class members violated their due process rights
and was therefore void. The question before the court was whether
notice need be given to the non-certified class members either under
FRCP 23(e) or the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Firstly,
FRCP 23(e) provides for approval of the court for dismissal or compro-
mise and notice being given to all class members. '0 9 FRCP 23(e), how-
ever, does not cover the situation where the class has not been certified
and the case is settled or dismissed. The court of appeals held, rather,
that notice of the settlement to members of a certified class is necessary
as a matter of constitutional due process because the settlement or dis-
missal of a certified class action will be res judicata as to claims of the
individual class members.
Many courts, however, as noted by the Seventh Circuit, have
stated that once a class action is filed it must be assumed to be a class
action and therefore FRCP 23(e) notice is required." 10 The court noted
that the purposes served by the imposition of FRCP 23(e) requirements
to putative class actions include deterring plaintiffs appending a class
claim merely to strengthen their bargaining power in settlements. In
addition, requiring notice to uncertified class members also insures that
their interests will be protected. Even though their claims would not be
barred by res judicata, a settlement of a class action could affect the
putative class in several ways. The settlement may seek to achieve
structural relief that putative class members may not agree with. If the
relief is in the form of both structural and compensatory relief, trade-
offs at the expense of the putative class may occur, and, also, the relief
may be from a limited fund and thus putative class members may have
been denied compensatory relief.
The court noted, however, that requiring notice in every potential
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:...
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides:
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
110. 661 F.2d at 665. See also Walican v. Waterloo Community School Dist., 80 F.R.D. 492
(N.D. Iowa 1978); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Duncan v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Rotzenburg v. Neenah Joint
School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 181 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Held v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 64 F.R.D. 346 (S.D.
Tex. 1974); Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Washington v. Wyman,
54 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Yaffe v.
Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
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class claim may harm the beneficiaries. Such notice will be time con-
suming and costly and the time delay involved in notice and certifica-
tion determination may well delay the relief eventually provided to the
class members. Therefore it would also discourage voluntary resolu-
tion and settlement. Thus the court rejected any requirement that
FRCP 23(e) be applied to all settled class actions including those that
have not been certified, but rather gave discretion to the district court
to assess the prejudice to absent class members caused by the settle-
ment, the costs of notice and of a certification hearing, as well as other
factors, in making its determination."' The court noted that the ap-
proach they adopted was consistent with that of the Fourth Circuit rule
in Shelton v. Pargo, Inc.."i2
Here, although the settlement did not bind absent class members,
there was a prejudice to their claims. The practical effect of the settle-
ment was to distribute the $18,000,000 fund of the Crisis Intervention
Program [CIP] in a manner that may have been contrary to the inter-
ests of putative class members. Assuming that the absent individuals
would have chosen that the funds be spent on providing programs
rather than individualized damage payments, there was no guarantee
that they would decide to seek the mix of structural relief eventually
agreed upon. More importantly, the absent class members could not
participate in the agreements reached between plaintiffs' counsel and
defendants. The court noted that notice and an opportunity to be
heard are the touchstones of due process and decided that the notice to
absent putative class members was required.
The court then went on to determine whether or not a class should
have been certified. First, it noted that the standard of review was
whether or not the district court's decision denying certification was an
abuse of discretion. The court in a rather lengthy footnote," 3 deter-
mined that this would have to be a FRCP 23(b)(3) action because the
final form of relief obtained would be monetary in nature. It noted that
class certification under (b)(2) was not appropriate where the relief re-
quested, or in this case obtained, was monetary in nature. It did note
that an argument for (b)(1)(A) certification existed. There is a line of
authority that holds where the plaintiffs seek distribution of money
from a limited fund, class certification under (b)(1)(A) is appropri-
111. 661 F.2d at 666.
112. 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978), see also Moreno v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 80 F.R.D. 282
(W.D. Tex. 1978); Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp., 582 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977).
113. 661 F.2d at 668 n.24.
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ate.11 4 In this case, however, such certification was inapplicable be-
cause this case was a limited fund only because of the way that the
plaintiffs had structured the settlement. The court also noted that other
decisions have held the mere fact that damages would have to be paid
to some plaintiffs and not to others in a subsequent action did not place
the case in a (b)(1)(A) category.'' 5
The court noted that the threshold question was whether a class
existed. The class sought to be certified was defined as "those individu-
als eligible for CIP assistance but who were denied assistance or were
discouraged from applying because of the existence of the invalid regu-
lation promulgated by the CSA." 16 The problem here was that since
membership in the class depended on each individual's state of mind
the class was quite difficult to determine. The court would have to pro-
ceed with the Sisyphean task of identifying those individuals who not
only qualified for CIP assistance but also knew of the existence of the
regulation, a task which would be a burden on the court and require a
huge expenditure of valuable court time. The fact that it would be so
difficult to determine the class was a proper factor for the district court
to consider in denying class certification.
The court also noted that FRCP 23(b)(3) provides that"... ques-
tions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members. . . . 117 It
noted that the "predomination" inquiry must take two steps. First, one
must look at the substantive elements of plaintiffs' cause of action and
the proof necessary for the various elements. Secondly, one must in-
quire into the form that trial of these issues would take. At this point, it
becomes necessary to examine the procedural devices and alternatives
available in trying class actions. Although the question of the validity
of the CSA regulation was quite simple and thus would be appropriate
for class determination, determining the state of the mind of each po-
tential recipient who relied on the invalid regulation was quite difficult
and not common to the entire class. The court relied in part on a New
York case, Crasto v. Estate of Kaskel,"18 in which the New York court
noted that fraud cases may be unsuitable for class treatment because of
variations in the representations made or degrees of reliance thereupon.
114. E.g., Cass Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 63 F.R.D. 34, 37 (E.D.S.D. 1974).
115. In Re Northern Dist. of Cal., 521 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982).
116. 661 F.2d at 669.
117. Id. at 672.
118. 63 F.R.D. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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(Several courts, however, have done away with individual reliance and
have substituted a "generalized reliance" in class action fraud cases.)
Here, as in Crasto, subclassing would do little to ease the burdens of
the individual trials. The court thus found that the individual recov-
eries and individual reliance factors argued against class certification
here.
The court of appeals went on to discuss the problem of "fluid re-
covery" or "cy pres." Several cases in class actions have utilized such a
procedure in which all damages are paid into the court and devoted to
some worthwhile task. One extreme would be to automatically utilize a
fluid recovery mechanism as a procedural alternative to a class action
disposition, while, at another extreme, is the position that any fluid re-
covery mechanism is unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit in Windham
v. American Brands, Inc. ,'9 for example, rejected the use of a fluid
recovery. The Seventh Circuit here, however, held that a careful case-
by-case analysis of the use of the fluid recovery method is the better
approach. In this approach "we focus on the various substantive poli-
cies that the use of a fluid recovery would serve in the particular
case."' 120 The first factor looked at by the Seventh Circuit was whether
a fluid recovery is needed to deter the defendant from illegal conduct.
Here there was no illegality, only the inevitable problems that arise
when administrating such a complex regulation. The second factor,
that of forcing the disgorging of an illegally obtained profit, also coun-
seled against the use of fluid recovery. In this case, the CSA had not
gained anything financially from its alleged illegal conduct. The final
factor-whether the statute had a compensatory purpose-did weigh in
favor of a fluid recovery. The act authorizing CSA to administer assist-
ance programs had as its chief aim assisting low income individuals in
dealing with the high cost of energy. This factor alone, however, did
not clearly require fluid recovery. The court concluded, therefore, that
the use of fluid recovery mechanism was not necessary to further the
substantive policies at issue.
The court then went on to determine the question of "manageabil-
ity," which is intertwined with the problem of notice. The court noted
that the number of participants in the CSA programs numbered more
than one million. The cost of notifying these class members was a
proper factor to consider in denying class certification. These problems
119. 565 F.2d 59, 72 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
120. 661 F.2d at 676.
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led the court to conclude that the use of the class action device would
have been unmanageable.
Note that here the court is saying both that the settlement was void
because of its effects on the class members and that there should not be
a class action because it would be unmanageable. A contradiction then
appears in the Seventh Circuit's decision. The court posits the exist-
ence of a "class" yet denies the existence of a "class action." The end
result of the court's concern for the class members' rights is that the
action that sought to help them was dismissed. However, the court's
discussion of the problems of fluid recovery, manageability and
whether or not this was a FRCP 23(b)(1), (2), or (3) action gives gui-
dance for future cases.
Judge Swygert dissented. He felt that notice should have been
given of the settlement. He noted that although the Supreme Court has
held that individual notice must be provided to those class members
who are identifiable through reasonable effort,' 21 the Court has not
hesitated to approve of resort to publication in cases where it is not
reasonably possible or practical to give more adequate notice. 22 Judge
Swygert held that the denial of certification was an abuse of discretion.
He thought that the putative class met all the prerequisites for certifica-
tion imposed by FRCP 23(a) and (b)(2) and that there is a line of au-
thority which supports the proposition that a class may include
"chilled" plaintiffs.' 23 Judge Swygert also disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that a fluid recovery was inappropriate. He noted that the
statute's purpose, to reduce the impact of high energy costs on low-
income people including the elderly and poor, is served by the settle-
ment decree. A comparison of the dissenting and majority opinions
shows the debatable nature of certification under FRCP 23.
In Curtiss- Wright Corp. v. Hefand,124 the court dealt with the
question of whether or not a district court could deny one of the mem-
bers of the class his full proportionate share of the settlement without
giving him a hearing in a class action settlement. The court ruled that
it could. The case was brought on behalf of a class composed of pur-
chasers of Cenco stock during a certain period. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
which was a member of the plaintiff's class, had purchased Cenco stock
heavily in 1974 and within a few months had amassed 5% of the stock.
121. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974).
122. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
123. Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972); Carpenter v. Davis, 424 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.
1970).
124. 687 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1982).
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It wanted to buy even more and did a preliminary review and audit of
Cenco's operation. Curtiss-Wright learned that Cenco had poor to
non-existent accounting controls but bought Cenco stock anyway-by
the time the fraud was unmasked it owned 16% of the stock, far more
than any stockholder. Thus, one of the plaintiffs included in the class
actually had some knowledge of the fraud involved.
The district court ruled that Curtiss-Wright could share in the set-
tlement only to the extent of its purchases prior to the business review
they made of Cenco. The court of appeals affirmed. Because the class
action procedure is equitable in origin, the judge can make an equita-
ble allocation of the damages among the parties. The court held that
"due process is not affronted, because a plaintiff is not required to sub-
mit his claim in the class action but can withdraw and sue sepa-
rately."' 125 The case is interesting because it includes members of the
plaintiff class who well could have been on the defendant's side.126 The
court by implication rules that such a class action may be maintained
where the court limits the rights of one of the plaintiffs in order to
achieve justice. The court states that the "opt-out" right gives the per-
son the due process protection that they need. One may query whether
or not in a (b)(1) or a (b)(2) class action, in which there is no such opt-
out right, such an adjustment of a settlement would be valid.
In Tidwell v. Schweiker, 127 the Seventh Circuit ruled on a question
that concerned the standing requirements of class representatives. The
case involved a lawsuit against the Director of the Illinois Department
of Mental Health, the Secretary of the United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare and the Administrator of the Social
Security Administration concerning the practice of Illinois mental insti-
tutions taking the social security and disability benefits of institutional-
ized mental patients for the payment of hospital costs. The patients
were asked to sign a form allowing the state to accumulate their bene-
fits in a trust fund to be used for payment of hospital costs. The ques-
tion was whether or not Tidwell had standing to challenge the signing
of the forms since neither he nor any of the named plaintiffs actually
signed this form or were asked to sign the form. The court ruled that
the named plaintiffs were subject to being asked to sign the form and
subject to the illegal system. Thus they had standing to represent those
who did sign the form as well as those who did not. The question of
125. Id. at 1666.
126. Cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (where such a suit was ruled to be not a proper
class action).
127. 677 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1982).
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who can represent whom in a class action is a complicated one and one
which has recently been dealt with by the case of General Telephone Co.
of Southwest v. Falcon. I28 Although the Supreme Court has tried in
Falcon to tighten the representation standards, the standards are still
loose enough to accomodate Tidwell. Certainly, one can represent
others in a class action besides those who share exactly the same factual
circumstances. The exact dimensions of one's ability to represent
others, however, has never been finally determined.
VII. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Lektro- Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co. ,129 a very complicated case which
has been going on for 16 years through the Illinois and federal court
systems (up to the supreme court of each) held that a preliminary in-
junction hearing does not bind the district court after a full trial on the
issues. The rule, the court noted, that a preliminary injunction is by
nature preliminary and does not bind the court in a subsequent trial on
the merits is well settled in the Seventh Circuit and other circuits.
VIII. SANCTIONS
In several cases the Seventh Circuit dealt with the problem of what
to do with recalcitrant or negligent counsel. Some of these cases were
due to just pure delay, one dealt with a frivolous appeal, and others
involved problems with discovery. A "delay" case was Ruiz v. Cady, 30
in which the district court had issued a writ of habeas corpus because
the Wisconsin Attorney General had failed to comply with a court or-
der requiring filing of copies of the state court's transcript. The court of
appeals concluded that the release of Mr. Ruiz was a drastic remedy
and an abuse of discretion. The court's language towards the Wiscon-
sin Attorney General, however, was very uncomplimentary. In this
case, the district court had ordered the respondent to answer the peti-
tion for habeas corpus and to file copies of the state trial transcripts
within twenty days. By this time the Wisconsin Attorney General had
known for more than one and a half months that it would have to file
the state court's transcript. One day after they were due, counsel for
the Attorney General contacted the district court by telephone and re-
quested an extension of time. The next day, the district court issued an
order granting Ruiz's writ of habeas corpus, although it did grant a 90-
128. 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982).
129. 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1277 (1982).
130. 660 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1981).
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day stay so that they could re-try Ruiz on his first degree murder con-
viction. The court of appeals, in reversing, noted that a default judg-
ment without full inquiry into the merits is especially rare when
entered against a custodian in a habeas corpus proceeding:
Although such a remedy is extreme, and may well conffict with the
public's right to protection, we think it should be preserved as a sanc-
tion against a respondent's unwarranted delay. Where the respon-
dent is guilty of long and inadequately explained delays, it may be
presumed that the petitioner is being illegally confined. 131
The court noted, however, that it was not condoning the Attorney Gen-
eral's negligence nor saying that the Attorney General would be al-
lowed at least one late filing or delay in a habeas corpus case. "To the
contrary, we are in complete sympathy with the district court's concern
that the attorney general's staff does not live up to its obligations in
prisoner cases." Although the district court's decision was reversed, the
Attorney General of Wisconsin should be unhappy reading the Sev-
enth Circuit opinion-small comfort to Ruiz, one suspects.
In Ellingsworth v. Chrysler,3 2 the defendants appealed from the
denial of their post-trial motions to set aside a default judgment. In
this case, default was entered after their attorney had failed to appear
at four status calls and failed to appear on the date of trial. A review of
the proceedings below showed that the trial date was set in an ambigu-
ous manner and it was quite possible that counsel could have misun-
derstood. Furthermore no written notice was ever sent to the attorney
or the defendants to confirm the date of trial. The Seventh Circuit
noted that "a default judgment, like a dismissal, is a harsh sanction
which should usually be employed only in extreme situations, or when
other less drastic sanctions have proven unavailing."'' 33 Thus it is ap-
propriate that FRCP 60(b)(1) 134 be liberally applied in the context of
default judgments, especially where those judgments result in honest
mistakes rather than willful misconduct, carelessness or negligence.
Because there was no willful pattern of disregard for the court orders or
rules, the district court was reversed.
In Maneikis v. Jordan,135 the Seventh Circuit imposed attorney's
131. Id. at 340.
132. 665 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1981).
133. Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) provides:
(b) Mistakes: Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
135. 678 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1982).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
fees directly against an attorney who had appealed an order prema-
turely. The trial court had entered an order dismissing a counterclaim
and the defendant moved for leave to reinstate the claim, which was
denied. The appeal was from that order. The Seventh Circuit said that
it was clear that the order was not a final one and that the appeal was
therefore frivolous. The court stated that this was a proper case to im-
pose sanctions under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 38. Since it
was the attorney's personal fault, the order should be personally issued
against the attorney for costs and fees.
Reading these three cases together does not give the negligent
counsel a feeling of security. Certainly the added expenses of taking an
appeal and having attorney's fees assessed against one should discour-
age people from indulging in such sloppy practices. In the area of
sanctions for failure to comply with discovery, the court has been much
harsher and has dismissed three cases. In Charter House Insurance Bro-
kers, Ltd v. New Hampshire Insurance Co. ,136 Charter House had sued
New Hampshire Insurance Company [hereinafter noted as N.H.I.C.]
for damages arising out of a 1978 government undercover operation.
N.H.I.C. had lent its cooperation to an F.B.I. investigation of organized
crime activities. Charter House claimed that it was induced by an
agent acting for N.H.I.C. to broker construction security bonds that
were not valid and sued N.H.I.C. for multi-million dollars worth of
damages. After the filing of the complaint, interrogatories were filed by
the defendant against the plaintiff Charter House. They were never
answered, and the judge ruled below that if discovery had not been
completed by February 22, 1980, a motion to dismiss would be granted.
On February 22, he granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice under
FRCP 41(b).137 On February 29, however, the plaintiff presented a
motion to vacate the order of dismissal. The judge then referred the
case to a magistrate to supervise production of all documents, ruling
that "Motion to vacate dismissal will be allowed in 45 days if magis-
trate certifies to Court that all documents have been turned over."' 38
Subsequently, it was determined that the documents that were finally
submitted by the plaintiff were not complete and several had not been
produced. The magistrate reported back "Simply stated, this record
reveals unquestionably that plaintiff has failed miserably in its attempt
to persuade this court that 'all documents have been turned over.' ,39
136. 667 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1981).
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
138. 667 F.2d at 602.
139. Id. at 603.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The judge adopted the magistrate's findings and conclusions and
dismissed.
The Seventh Circuit noted that there are two provisions under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for discovery sanctions. First, if dis-
covery responses are made but are inadequate, the party seeking dis-
covery must apply to the court for an order to compel discovery under
FRCP 37(a) and sanctions cannot be invoked until this court order is
disobeyed.14 0 Pursuant to FRCP 37(d), however, if a "party or an of-
ficer, director, or managing agent of a party, or a person designated
under FRCP 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party" does not
appear for a properly noticed deposition, does not answer or object to
interrogatories properly served, or does not make a written response to
a proper FRCP 34 request for production or inspection, the court may
impose sanctions directly, without first issuing an order to compel dis-
covery. 14 1 Charter House argued that its late and incomplete tender
ended the applicability of FRCP 37(d) and set in motion instead the
procedures of 37(a) and 37(b). It then argued that these procedures
under 37(a) and (b) could not lead to dismissal because there had been
no order under FRCP 37(a). The court ruled that even if a court order
were necessary, counsel's promise that he would comply with the dis-
covery schedule could be treated as an order. The court noted that a
FRCP 37 dismissal requires a showing "of willfulness, bad faith or
fault" 142 and also that the standard for review is that of abuse of discre-
tion. Here there were findings below of wilifuilness and the like, and
therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion. Note that in this
case counsel was given more than one chance to fulfill his obligations
but refused to. Given that circumstance the sanction of dismissal seems
appropriate.
In Hindmon v. National-Ben Franklin Life Insurance Corp. ,143 an-
other entry of default occurred against the plaintiff and again the dis-
missal was affirmed. There was an initial status hearing on September
16, 1980, at that time the court noted that Hindmon had failed to reply
to National-Ben's affirmative defenses and was in default in responding
to the counterclaim. The court ordered Hindmon to respond to de-
fendant's counterclaim and set a further status hearing. Plaintiff failed
140. Id. at 604; FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
142. The court cited as authority the standards of Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197, 212 (1958) and National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,
640 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976).
143. 677 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1982).
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to appear at the second hearing and, as of November 1, 1980, had yet to
comply with any of the defendant's discovery requests. The district
court set the case for trial on December 1, 1980. The district court
later, on a motion to dismiss, issued a clear warning that dismissal
could result if Hindmon failed to comply with the order compelling
discovery and with a notice of deposition. Hindmon failed to appear
that day for the taking of the deposition as required by the notice but
instead appeared the day after. As for the answer to interrogatories,
the client had never seen the interrogatories nor verified the answers as
required by FRCP 33(a). 44 The court specifically found that Hindom
had willfully and in bad faith refused to provide discovery by violating
the court's October 19 discovery order. Therefore his complaint was
dismissed and a default judgment entered on the counterclaim. Once
again, the court affirmed the dismissal, finding that plaintiffs course of
conduct clearly demonstrated a willful failure to comply with court-
ordered discovery. In this case the court below had walked the extra
mile with the erring counsel and party and thus the dismissal should
not have come as a great surprise to them.
Loctite Corp. v. Fe/-Pro, Inc 4 was a patent infringement suit con-
cerning the production of aerobic sealants and adhesives. Each of the
patents claimed certain ingredients in specific quantities. Loctite's bur-
den of proof, therefore, was to establish the presence of these specified
quantities in Fel-Pro's products. Fel-Pro's pursuit of this information
in discovery and Loctite's steadfast refusal to divulge it resulted in a
three-year discovery process which ended in dismissal of the plaintiffs
case. The court below dismissed the suit under FRCP 37(b) for Loc-
tite's failure to comply with the district court's order and granted Fel-
Pro attorney's fees. The plaintiff here, as in the prior cases, had com-
plied only minimally with what was ordered and had not assisted in the
resolution of the suit. "Instead, Loctite balked at every attempt to clar-
ify the issues; it now proffers technical arguments to induce this court to
believe its conduct was acceptable."' 46 The appellate court noted that
the trial judge, having dealt with the parties and issues in the suit for
almost three years, had the best opportunity to assess the need for the
desired discovery and the degree of compliance. His findings, there-
fore, were binding unless clearly erroneous. 47 The court affirmed the
dismissal finding there was no abuse of discretion. The court also af-
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
145. 667 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
146. Id. at 581.
147. The court noted that an evidentiary hearing was not required prior to a Rule 37 dismissal
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firmed the amount of the attorney's fees imposed against Loctite.148
The court of appeals did reverse a dismissal for discovery abuse in
Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers Local Union No. 130.149 In
this lawsuit, the court of appeals found that both sides had abused the
discovery process, asking improper questions of deponents' racial back-
ground and resisting discovery to the point of extreme recalcitrance.
Because both sides were at fault, the appellate panel considered it an
abuse of discretion to deny plaintiffs all opportunity for relief. How-
ever, the court stated that abuse on future discovery by any party
would not be tolerated. 150
Note that in these above cases, claims were dismissed and default
judgments were entered against those recalcitrant in the discovery pro-
cess. Discovery abuses have received a great deal of attention from
both scholars and the practicing bar in recent years. Perhaps these
three dismissals show that the Seventh Circuit and its district courts are
getting serious about enforcing the discovery rules. Such seriousness
can only be welcomed by attorneys who do comply with discovery and
who wish to move cases along. Thus, the court is following the recom-
mendations of many commentators who recommend a much tougher
stand on discovery.' 5'
IX. CIVIL CONTEMPT
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Premex, Inc. ,152 the
court dealt with a civil contempt decision brought on by a violation of a
consent decree. The consent decree had enjoined the defendant,
Premex from making untrue statements of material fact. After the in-
junction was entered, Premex sent an advertisement through the
United States mail which stated that it was registered as a commodity
trading advisor by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), when its CFTC registration had expired. The district court
held Premex in civil contempt.
The Seventh Circuit noted that no type of scienter or intent is nec-
essary for civil contempt. Even though a Premex employee had put out
where there has been adequate briefing on the circumstances surrounding the noncompliance. Id.
at 583 n.6.
148. The court however did remand for further and more detailed investigation of the attor-
ney's fee matter. Id. at 585.
149. 657 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1710 (1982).
150. Id. at 904.
151. See Nordenberg, Supreme Court and Discovery Reform: The Continuing Needfor an Um-
pire, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 543 (1980).
152. 655 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1981).
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the mailing without any of the company's executives being involved,
the lack of bad faith did not isolate Premex from liability. Premex next
argued that the proceeding was one classifiable as criminal contempt
and that, therefore, intent must be proven. The court distinguished be-
tween civil and criminal contempt: criminal contempt is punitive in
nature to vindicate the authority of the court, while civil contempt is
remedial with its purpose being either enforcement of a prior court or-
der or compensation for loss or damages. Inasmuch as the suggested
relief involved was that Premex notify all customers who had received
the wrongful literature of its inaccuracy, the relief was compensatory.
The court also noted that the trial court had the discretion to order
defendants to pay the aggrieved party's fees and expenses incurred in
bringing the violation to the court's attention.
IX. DIRECTED VERDICTS
In Bonner v. Coughlin, 53 the court of appeals ruled that a judg-
ment n.o.v. could be granted even if defendant failed to move for a
directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. The plaintiff argued
that FRCP 50(b) precluded the district court from granting a judgment
n.o.v. to such a party. The court did note that traditionally one has to
renew the motion for a directed verdict at the the close of all the evi-
dence as a prerequisite to move for a judgment n.o.v. Although some
courts adhear rigidly to the letter of the rule,154 other courts have re-
jected such a strict approach. The judges here ruled that they would be
flexible and allow the defendant to move for a judgment n.o.v. in the
circumstances. The court stated that it is better and safer practice to
renew the motion for a directed verdict at the end of all the evidence,
but in this case the court was willing to waive it.
X. ENTRY OF JUDGMENTS
In Harris v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc. ,155 the court ruled that a judg-
ment that had been entered by the clerk for damages was not a final
judgment because equitable relief still had to be given by the judge.
Because the judgment was rendered with respect to part of the relief
sought, it was not final. Thus the appeal in this case was premature
153. 657 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1981).
154. Eg., the Third Circuit in DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1195-
96 n.4 (3d Cir. 1978).
155. 659 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1981).
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and the court's subsequent refusal to consider equitable relief was
erroneous.
XII. POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
A. Appeal From FRCP 60(b) Motions
In Textile Banking Co. v. Rentschler 156 the court dealt with a prob-
lem of the time to appeal when a FRCP 60(b) 157 motion has been filed.
The appellant had filed a notice of appeal on June 16, 1980, seeking
review of the April 30 judgment order and the denial on June 5, 1980 of
a FRCP 60(b) motion to vacate that order. The time for filing an ap-
peal of the April 30 judgment order had expired on May 30, 1980, and
a FRCP 60(b) motion does not toll or extend the 30-day appeal period.
A FRCP 59(e) 158 motion to alter or amend the judgment does suspend
the 30-day appellate period when filed within 10 days of the district
court's final judgment. A FRCP 60(b) motion, however, is not the
equivalent of a FRCP 59(e) motion and thus cannot suspend the time.
The court of appeals found that the May 9 motion under FRCP
60(b) could not qualify as a FRCP 59(e) motion because it did not
propose an alteration or amendment and stated no grounds upon
which this type of relief could have been granted. Also the court held
that it was well-settled that the district court lacks the power to extend
the 10-day filing deadline imposed on FRCP 59(e) motions. The court
156. 657 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1981).
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides:
(b) Mistakes, Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (I) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or ex-
trinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equita-
ble that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justi-
fying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judg-
ment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally
notified as provided in Title 28 U.S.C. § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and
bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independ-
ent action.
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) provides:
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judg-
ment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
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of appeals pointed out that the majority of the circuits have now aban-
doned the position that filing of a notice of appeal strips the district
court of jurisdiction to hear a 60(b) motion. This procedure enables
litigants to pursue 60(b) relief in the district courts without running
afoul of the 30-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal. The court
again emphasized that FRCP 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion
of the district court, unless the underlying judgment was void. 159 Thus
the sole function of the court in reviewing the denial of a FRCP 60(b)
motion is to determine whether the district court failed to set aside a
void judgment or abused its discretion. The court therefore affirmed.
A denial of FRCP 60(b) motion, therefore, is difficult to overturn on
appeal. 160
B. FRCP 59(e)
Hairline Creations, Inc. v. Kefalas16 1 involved the question of
whether a post-judgment motion for attorney's fees in a trademark ac-
tion is a motion to alter or amend the judgment governed by FRCP
59(e) or a motion for costs under FRCP 54(d). Some of plaintifi's
claims and all of defendant's counter-claims were dismissed. Summary
judgment was granted in favor of Hairline on abuse of process, and in
favor of Kefalas on the federal trademark infringement claim. The
judgment was entered on August 29, 1980. On September 26, the
defendant filed a motion for attorney's fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117
which provides for attorney's fees for exceptional cases in federal trade-
mark litigation. Hairline argued that the motion for attorney's fees
constituted an effort to amend the judgment and thus was governed by
the strict non-extendable ten day time limit of FRCP 59(e). 162 Kefalas
responded that the motion was one for costs under FRCP 54(d),163
which imposes no time limit. The Seventh Circuit noted that the word
"cost" in FRCP 54(d) is not defined but it includes such items as court
fees and witness fees. The court also noted that post-judgment motions
159. See also Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1256
(1982).
160. Eg., Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
161. 664 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1981).
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e), see supra note 158 and accompanying text.
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) provides:
(d) Costs. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the
United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs; but costs against the United States, its officers, and
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. Costs may be taxed by
the clerk on one day's notice. On motion served within 5 days thereafter, the action of
the clerk may be reviewed by the court.
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for attorney's fees have not been uniformly governed by one rule.
Rather courts have accepted motions for attorney's fees under both
FRCP 54(d) and FRCP 59(e). The reason for this is that the rules of
procedure fail to designate explicitly a time for requesting attorney's
fees. The court ruled that a motion for attorney's fees under § 1117 is
actually a motion to amend the judgment and thus is governed by
FRCP 59(e).
Hairline may have been overruled by White v. New Hampshire De-
partment of Employment Security,164 in which the Supreme Court held
that a motion for attorney's fees under § 1988 does not have to be made
within the ten day limit of FRCP 59(e). Although White involved
§ 1988,165 the language of the Court indicates that the rejection of the
ten-day limit should apply to all motions for fees. Time limits in cases
other than those involving § 1988 are not definitely decided, and there-
fore counsel should play it safe and make motions within the limits of
FRCP 59(e).
XIII. APPELLATE REVIEW OF FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS
The Seventh Circuit had several cases that reviewed the factual
determinations below. They concerned summary judgments, one judg-
ment n.o.v., and one review of a judge's findings on the clearly errone-
ous standard. One case involved the situation in which there were no
findings of fact below, and the circuit remanded for such findings. Lan-
dau v. JD. Barter Construction Co. ,166 concerned an appeal from two
orders granting summary judgment in favor of defendants in a patent
infringement action. The trial court granted the defendants' counter-
claim that the action was based on a patent obtained by fraud on the
Patent Office and thus awarded attorney's fees and costs to the defend-
ants. The problem was that the court below had summarily decided for
the defendants and did not give any reasons or make any findings of
fact in order to support its decision. While it is true that FRCP 52167
164. 102 S. Ct. 1162 (1982).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
166. 657 F.2d 158 (7th Cir. 1981).
167. FED. R. Civ. P. 52 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon,
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or refusing interlocu-
tory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of
law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary
for purposes of review. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credi-
bility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them,
shall be considered as the findings of the court. If an opinion or memorandum of deci-
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does not require that findings of fact and conclusions of law be entered
when the matter in question is decided by summary judgment, 68 the
court found that such findings are quite helpful for appellate review
and especially desirable in patent cases "where the facts are technical
and complex and where the summary judgment may be grounded in
several legal theories."' 169 Thus, "the absence of such a statement in
this case leaves us no clue as to why the district court concluded that
summary judgment was appropriate."'' 70 The inapplicability of sum-
mary judgment to patent actions in most cases coupled with the total
lack of any factual statements whatsoever resulted in a remand for fur-
ther factual development.
In Egger v. Phillips,'7' the court reversed where an FBI agent had
sued his former supervisor for transferring him, allegedly for his free
speech activities. Egger had complained to his supervisor at the Indi-
anapolis field office of the FBI that certain members there were in-
volved with organized crime, after which Egger was transferred to the
Chicago field office. In a suit claiming violation of his first amendment
rights, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
As in the prior case, when patent cases were said to be inappropriate
for summary judgment, the court stated that cases involving motive
and intent are "particularly inappropriate for summary judgment:"
A determination involving a person's state of mind is seldom suscep-
tible to direct proof, but must be inferred from circumstantial evi-
dence. If improper motive can reasonably be inferred from evidence
properly before the court, affidavits denying such motivation do not
entitle a defendant to summary judgment.1 2
In determining that the transfer was not in retaliation for free
speech, the district court had to evaluate the evidence and choose to
credit defendant's rather than plaintiff's interpretation of several
events. According to the Seventh Circuit "such judicial weighing of the
evidence is impermissible on a motion for summary judgment, espe-
cially where issues of motive are involved."7 3
In Madyun v. Thompson ,'7 the court again reversed the granting
sion is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear
therein. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions
under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b).
168. 657 F.2d at 162.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 669 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1982).
172. Id. at 502.
173. Id. at 503.
174. 657 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1981).
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of the summary judgment, in this case in an action involving prison
conditions. The court below had dismissed several of the allegations of
the plaintiffs on summary judgment because plaintiffs had filed no op-
posing affidavits as required by FRCP 56(e).175 A straight-forward ap-
plication of FRCP 56(e) would require that summary judgment be
granted in such a case. However, in pro se prisoner cases a different
rule applies. The Seventh Circuit, along with the District of Columbia
in Hudson v. Hardy176  and the Fourth Circuit in Davis v.
Zahradnick,177 has held that plaintiffs have to be informed of their
right to file affidavits. The district court erred in granting summary
judgment without first alerting plaintiffs to the need for counter-affida-
vits. Given a meaningful opportunity to gather affidavits the plaintiffs
might be able to show that the prison official's policies were not always
followed. "Technical rigor in dealing with summary judgment proce-
dure is inappropriate where unrepresented and uninformed prisoners
are involved."' 178
Sharp v. Egler179 arose out of an automobile collision with a tree.
Plaintiff, Miss Sharp, was riding with Egler after leaving a bar about 4
a.m. Egler ran into the tree and Sharp sustained serious physical in-
jury. She sued Egler for $750,000 and included Egler's employer, Bill
Hanka Auto Sales, under respondeat superior. Both defendants' mo-
tions for summary judgment were granted. After discussing the choice
of law problems involved in the case, the court of appeals found that a
jury could reasonably have found that Egler had been guilty of the
wanton misconduct necessary for liability under the Indiana Guest
Statute. 180 Summary judgment for Egler was reversed. The Seventh
Circuit found, however, that the use of the car was not within the scope
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides:
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is compe-
tent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere alega-
tions or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
176. 412 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
177. 600 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1979).
178. 657 F.2d at 877.
179. 658 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1981).
180. IND. CODE § 9-3-3-1 (1976).
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of the employment. Therefore summary judgment was affirmed on the
respondeat superior claim.
In yet another case, Enqui,, Inc. v. Smith-McDonald Corp. ,8s the
court reversed the granting of a summary judgment motion. The trial
court had granted summary judgment against one defendant because
that defendant had pled in a related state case that certain oil water
separator tanks had met specifications. In his third-party action that
defendant was alleging that the tanks did not meet specifications. The
Seventh Circuit ruled that an admission in a pleading in a state court
case is admissible, in support of a summary judgment motion, but it
cannot be used as the sole basis for summary judgment. Opposing
memoranda and exhibits can raise an issue of material fact: "When a
statement or plea from another case is sought to be used as an admis-
sion in a second suit, courts are therefore careful to allow the opposing
party a full opportunity to explain the purported admission to demon-
strate that there is an issue of material fact."' 182
In every case dealing with summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit
ruled that summary judgment was inappropriate. District courts
should be wary of granting it.183
Klockner, Inc. v. Federal Wire Mill Corp.184 involved an appeal
from the trial court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of FRCP 52(a).18 5 The court of appeals states:
Such findings will not be set aside unless the reviewing court, after
reviewing the evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. . . . When such findings turn
heavily upon issues of credibility, the trial court's ability to view the
witnesses' demeanor and assess their credibility heightens the reluc-
tance of the appellate court to substitute its judgment on the cold
record for that of the trier of fact, and the burden of establishing
error is commensurately increased. 186
The court noted in a footnote that a less exacting application of the
clearly erroneous standard might be appropriate in a "paper case"
where the evidence presented to the court is primarily documentary. 187
In the case at bar, however, the determination turned heavily upon the
trial court's credibility assessment of the live testimony and thus would
181. 655 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1981).
182. Id. at 118.
183. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
184. 663 F.2d 1370 (7th Cir. 1981).
185. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a).
186. 663 F.2d at 1375.
187. Id. at 1375 n.1. The court cited City of Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co., 616
F.2d 976, 979-80 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
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not be an appropriate instance for such a heightened review.' 88 The
court therefore affirmed the judgment against the defendant.
XIV. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, RES JUDICATA
AND LAW OF THE CASE
In several cases, the Seventh Circuit decided issues arising under
collateral estoppel, res judicata and law of the case. In Ohio-Sealy Mat-
tress Manufacturing Co. v. Sealy Inc. ,19 the court in a complicated an-
titrust suit affirmed a dismissal of Ohio-Sealy's motion to award it
supplemental damages. Under the antitrust laws, a cause of action ac-
crues to the plaintiff each time the defendant engages in antitrust con-
duct that harms the plaintiff. At the time of accrual, the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all damages caused by the antitrust conduct includ-
ing damages that will be suffered during and after trial. However,
where damages that might be suffered after trial are speculative or
where they are unprovable at the time of trial, the cause of action for
these damages is not yet accrued and the plaintiff may thereafter sue
the defendant to recover these future damages when they accrue. Res
judicata bars the plaintiff from splitting his cause of action, forcing him
to seek all the damages that have been accrued as a result of the de-
fendant's antitrust conduct. Those damages that Ohio-Sealy sought
that were caused by antitrust conduct accruing after the verdict in this
case created an independent cause of action. Ohio-Sealy had to pursue
these damages in another lawsuit; it could not seek them in a supple-
mental procedure in the present case.
In Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp. ,190 the lower
court decided that res judicata barred a litigant from bringing a con-
tract claim in state court following a dismissal on the merits of his fed-
eral antitrust claim where the litigant did not join the contract claim as
an alternative theory of recovery in the federal action.' 91 Because the
Seventh Circuit found that appellant had split his cause of action, it
affirmed.
188. See also the recent Seventh Circuit case discussed above, Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo
Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1277 (1982).
189. 669 F.2d 490 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, (1982).
190. 657 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1981).
191. The district court had enjoined a state court proceeding litigating some of the issues that
had not been litigated in the federal court procedures. The appellant objected claiming that the
district court erred in enjoining the state court proceedings pursuant to the relitigation exception
of the Federal Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). The court of appeals disagreed,
finding the relitigation exception applicable to allow injunction of a state proceeding in order to
protect and effectuate the federal court judgments, which includes enforcing the principle of res
judicata.
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In the federal action the district court dismissed the third count of
plaintiff's complaint for failing to state a cause of action. While the
appeal from the district court's decision was pending, plaintiff filed a
three-count complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The sec-
ond count there alleged the same facts as were in count three of the
federal action. The Seventh Circuit held that the question was whether
or not the decision in the first suit was one based on legal rights as
distinguished from a ruling on matters of practice, procedure, jurisdic-
tion or form. If the former, the case would be barred. The district
court had to deal with the substance of Harper's allegations and not
merely with jurisdiction. Therefore it had reached the merits of the
claim and barred a further state court litigation under the doctrine of
res judicata.
In Gasbarra v. Park-Ohio Industries, Inc. ,192 summary judgment
was granted against the plaintiff on the grounds that he had already
litigated the issue in a prior lawsuit. In a prior lawsuit it had been
determined that the defendant had wrongfully attempted to terminate
the employment agreement between the parties, that the attempted ter-
mination was ineffectual, and that the defendant was liable for salary
that had accrued under the contract. In this lawsuit, the plaintiff was
suing for fringe benefits. The court decided that since res judicata ap-
plies not only to matters actually determined in the prior case but also
to matters that properly could have been raised in the prior suit, the
lawsuit was barred. One interesting point in this case is that the Sev-
enth Circuit assumed that Illinois law applied on the issue of res judi-
cata. Some circuits disagree with this, holding that the scope of res
judicata and collateral estoppel is a matter of federal law, even in di-
versity litigation.' 93
In two cases, the court of appeals discussed issues of collateral es-
toppel. In Madyun v. Thompson, 194 the court held that certain issues
brought by prisoners incarcerated in Pontiac State Prison were not
barred by collateral estoppel. The district court had ruled that one set
of allegations duplicated questions resolved by remedial order in Pres-
ton v. Thompson.195 The Seventh Circuit ruled that the instant plain-
tiffs were neither represented nor had participated in Preston, and thus
they were not barred by collateral estoppel. In Pinto Trucking Service,
192. 655 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1981).
193. E.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.),reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 1026
(1975).
194. 657 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1981).
195. 589 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1978).
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Inc. v. Motor Dispatch, Inc. ,196 the court also held that the defendants
there had not participated in the prior lawsuit to a degree that would
bind them by res judicata. In the prior case the appellants were dis-
missed out at the end of plaintiffs case. Thus they had not had a
chance to participate fully in the trial and therefore could not be collat-
erally estopped by the jury findings in that case.
In Johnson v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago ,'19 7 the Sev-
enth Circuit applied the doctrine of the law of the case and stated that
the law embodied in a prior judgment should apply where there was no
intervening conflicting Supreme Court precedent. The case involved
the student assignment plan based on racial quotas for two high schools
in Chicago, Gage Park and Morgan Park. The district court and the
court of appeals had held the Board's use of quotas to be constitutional.
It was then appealed to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
remanded it for a determination of whether a consent decree imposing
quotas or any plan implementing that decree had mooted the contro-
versy. The district court determined that the case was not moot, a de-
termination with which the court of appeals agreed. The Seventh
Circuit further ruled that according to the law of the case doctrine a
prior determination of law will be upset only under "unusual and com-
pelling circumstances." Since no such circumstances existed in this
case there was no warrant for a departure from the law of the case
doctrine. On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court stated that since
it had vacated the judgment of the court of appeals in this case, the law
of the case doctrine no longer applied. 98
CONCLUSION
Even in reviewing the decisions of just one court of appeals in only
one area of the law, the reviewer cannot fail to be impressed by the
volume of cases the court is required to decide. Many of the cases with
which the court is presented are mundane; others raise important issues
of far-reaching consequence. Unlike the Supreme Court, the court of
appeals has little control over its caseload; it must decide the routine
cases as well as the novel ones.
When an appellate court with a large caseload decides the vast
majority of its cases in written opinions it faces a bit of a dilemma. On
the one hand, if opinions are less than exhaustively researched, care-
196. 649 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1981).
197. 664 F.2d 1069 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2223 (1982).
198. 102 S. Ct. at 2224.
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fully considered and painstakingly drafted, those opinions are never-
theless precedent for future cases. On the other hand, if full and
detailed opinions are rendered in every case a goodly amount of time is
spent on cases which are routine and proportionately less, one suspects,
on the truly significant.
One solution is to decide cases by unpublished orders, and the
Seventh Circuit's local rules provide for so doing. 199 However, when
unpublished orders look like full opinions, as they do in many cases,
one cannot help but feel uncomfortable that such pronouncements are
not circulated and cannot be cited as authority. First amendment and
equal protection considerations aside, the appearance is that the court
is trying to hide something, either poor scholarship or special
treatment.
An alternative solution might be to decide routine cases, and non-
routine ones where the issues are not adequately presented, by means
of truly summary orders. Where the court of appeals affirms the dis-
trict court, it could be understood that summary affirmance has no
precedential value. When the district court is reversed, the reasons for
reversal and any necessary directions to the lower court could be em-
bodied in a perfunctory order, although the summary procedure would
seem to lend itself more easily to affirmance than to reversal.
It might be objected that the use of summary orders could too eas-
ily be abused. But a litigant always has the right to seek rehearing en
banc and Supreme Court review in any particular case, and frequent
abuse would certainly be noticed by the bar and the press. It seems
highly unlikely that a wider use of summary or perfunctory orders in
routine or poorly presented cases would dilute the quality of justice in
individual cases. And having to produce fewer opinions ought to pro-
mote the full, thoughtful, careful, scholarly consideration of significant
issues that have been properly presented for decision.2°°
199. Circuit Rule 35 provides for unpublished orders.
200. See generally, Reynolds and Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United
States Courts of Appeals." The Price of Reform, 48 U. CI. L. REV. 573 (1981); Reynolds and
Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L. J. 807 (1979); Reyn-
olds and Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in
the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978); see also, D'Amato, Legal
Uncertainty, 71 CALtF. L. REV. 1 (1983).
